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Abstract
The completeness axiom of choice has been questioned for long, and in response, theoretical
models of decision making allowing for incomplete preferences have been developed. So far
the theoretical accomplishments have however not been paired with empirical evidence on
the actual existence of incomplete preferences. In this paper we provide empirical evidence in
support of the existence of incomplete preferences due to multiple priors over an ambiguous
event. We design experimental decision tasks where specific choice patterns are consistent
with incomplete preferences under uncertainty but inconsistent with models assuming com-
plete preferences. We find that approximately half of the subjects behave consistent with
incomplete preferences due to multiple priors and that the observed behavioral pattern can-
not be attributed to mistakes, probability weighting or regret aversion. In a robustness test
we show that the observed behavior is robust to a prize variation in the ambiguous prospect
and consistent with comparative statics predictions based on incomplete preferences under
uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
It is a standard assumption in economics that individuals are able to pair-wise compare all
available choice options. In other words, it is assumed that decision makers have complete
preferences. Although core to most decision making models, the completeness assumption has
been questioned since a long time. Both, on the grounds that it may be intuitively too demanding
and not even appealing normatively. In the words of Aumann (1962): “Like others of the axioms,
[completeness] is inaccurate as a description of real life; but unlike them, we find it hard to
accept even from the normative viewpoint” (p.446). More recently, Wakker (2010) thoroughly
discusses problems of the completeness assumption in models for decision making under risk and
uncertainty. In this paper we provide empirical evidence in support of the existence of incomplete
preferences under uncertainty.
Many crucial ‘real life’ choices are between risky and ambiguous prospects and knowledge
about (in)completeness of preferences under uncertainty is thus important also from an applied
viewpoint. For instance, in medical decision making frequently choices have to be made be-
tween traditional treatments with known success rates and side effects and novel treatments
with unknown success rates and side effects. A prominent recent example at hand is the (discus-
sion regarding the) application of experimental vaccines during the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak
in West Africa (Alang, 2015).1 Another, less dramatic example is the choice between a secure
investment possibility with a known but perhaps low success rate and a highly uncertain in-
vestment with an unknown but potentially high success probability. Similarly, financial markets
arguably exhibit high uncertainty and investors may have to choose between investing in risky
bonds and ambiguous assets (e.g., Mukerji and Tallon, 2001). In such cases models of incomplete
preferences are likely delivering different predictions and prescriptions than models of complete
preferences (e.g., Bossaerts et al., 2010) and it is, thus, important to know if economic agents
indeed exhibit incomplete preferences. Moreover, not all people may exhibit incomplete prefer-
ences or the extent of incompleteness may differ across them. If so, it could be important for
policy ends to have a tool that discriminates between different types of (in)completeness.
Starting with the cited work of Aumann, the above described intuitive doubts and practical
importance led to the development of a number of theoretical models that drop the completeness
axiom and allow the decision maker to remain occasionally indecisive. In these models a decision
maker (henceforth, DM) may be indecisive when pursuing different, and possibly orthogonal,
objectives which lead to multiple representations of the same choice option (see, e.g., Ok, 2002;
Dubra et al., 2004; Ok et al., 2012, on multi-objective decision making). Further, a DM may
1For more information see, e.g., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ .
1
be indecisive when lacking the information necessary to determine which option is best, such
as when choice objects are uncertain prospects (see, e.g., Bewley, 2002; Gilboa et al., 2010;
Ok et al., 2012). More recently, theoretical models of incomplete preferences have also been
employed to explain the emergence of choice anomalies, such as the status quo bias and preference
reversals (see, among others, Mandler, 2004, 2005; Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005; Eliaz and Ok, 2006;
Ortoleva, 2010).
So far the theoretical accomplishments have however not been paired with empirical ev-
idence on the actual existence of incomplete preferences.2 The laboratory experiment of
Danan and Ziegelmeyer (2006), reported in a working paper, constitutes the only empirical work
in economics known to us that explicitly looks for incompleteness of preferences. In this exper-
iment, it is observed that subjects postpone choices between risky prospects and sure amounts
to a future session, even when postponing comes at a small cost. The authors claim that such
decisions reveal “true indecisiveness.” However, for this interpretation to hold it needs to be
assumed that there is a link between incomplete preferences and the concept of preference for
flexibility.3
Generally, a major obstacle to obtaining convincing empirical evidence on incomplete prefer-
ences resides in the fact that preferences need to be revealed via choice. For instance, indecisive-
ness due to incomplete preferences may be difficult to distinguish from preference indifference.
Therefore, incomplete preferences may remain hidden unless some specific assumptions are in-
troduced (as in the work cited above).
In this paper we employ an empirical strategy that circumvents this problem by using decision
tasks where specific choice patterns are consistent with incomplete preferences under uncertainty
but inconsistent with models assuming complete preferences. Specifically, we present the results
of three experiments that together can reveal the existence of incomplete preference relations,
due to multiple priors over an ambiguous event.
In the first experiment, denoted Risk-Ambi, subjects face a series of decision situations where
they are presented a risky and an ambiguous prospect. All prospects, risky and ambiguous, are
characterized by the same two possible outcomes, and level and source of ambiguity are kept
constant in all decision situations. For the risky prospect the likelihood of winning a positive
prize differs across decision situations, in the range of 0 percent to 100 percent. In each of these
situations, a subject can either choose one of the two prospects, or select an indifference option
(option I), which delegates the choice between the two prospects to a fair random device. Im-
2One may sense here a similarity to the search of the Higgs boson in physics where also theory predicted its
existence long before its actual existence was empirically suggested (Aad et al., 2012).
3See Kraus and Sagi (2006) for a theoretical model.
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portantly, the choice task is designed in a way such that any model assuming a single prior on
the ambiguous event, or assuming a decision rule that reduces to a single prior representation
of the ambiguous prospect (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011), predicts that subjects choose option I
at most once. If however subjects choose option I multiple times, it is consistent with incom-
plete preferences due to holding multiple priors on the ambiguous prospect (Gilboa et al., 2010).
Subjects are forced to make some choice and when holding multiple priors option I is likely an
attractive option as it allows avoiding an active choice between risky and ambiguous prospects.
Moreover, the more dispersed the priors, the more decision situations in which prospects cannot
be ranked and the more often option I may be chosen.
To provide additional support for this interpretation, we also empirically test whether re-
peated choice of option I could be consistent with other prominent theoretical models of decision
making under uncertainty. First, we consider Prospect Theory, and more specifically the idea
that people weight probabilities non-linearly (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). To test this po-
tential explanation, we implement a choice task that allows us to estimate subjects’ probability
weighting function at the individual level. Second, we consider the possibility of mistakes or
‘thick indifference curves’ and conduct an additional experiment, denoted Risk-Sure, where sub-
jects make choices between risky prospects and a safe payment. If repeatedly choosing option I
were indeed due to mistakes unrelated to incomplete preferences, we should observe such a choice
pattern also in this set-up. Finally, we conduct a third experiment, denoted Risk-Ambi-high, that
is identical to Risk-Ambi, except that we increase the winning prize for the ambiguous prospect.
We provide theoretical comparative statics predictions based on the assumption of incomplete
preferences due to multiple priors and check if these predictions are carried out by the data.
In Risk-Ambi we find that as many as about half of the subjects choose option I multiple
times. These choices cannot be explained by likelihood insensitivity which, although present
in our sample, is not pronounced enough to support this interpretation. This suggests already
that the repeated choice of I could be due to incomplete preferences over the ambiguous event.
In Risk-Sure we observe, in stark contrast to the first experiment, that option I is hardly ever
chosen more than once. Hence, it is very unlikely that repeated choice of option I is a result
of mistakes or ‘thick’ indifference curves. Finally, in Risk-Ambi-high we observe again a large
number of subjects choosing option I, proving that this behavioral pattern is robust to a change
in incentives. Moreover, the comparative statics predictions based on incomplete preferences
are largely confirmed. We are thus confident that the repeated choice of option I is indeed an
expression of incomplete preferences under uncertainty.4
4Our study and results are related to a few recent papers investigating a possible preference for randomness
(Dominiak and Schnedler, 2011; Agranov and Ortoleva, 2013; Dwenger et al., 2014). We discuss these papers and
how our work relates to them in Section 6.
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The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out our general
empirical strategy. Section 3 describes in detail the design and results of experiment Risk-Ambi,
and Sections 4 and 5 report on experiments Risk-Sure and Risk-Ambi-high, respectively. The
paper closes with a discussion and conclusions in Section 6.
2 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy to reveal incomplete preferences under uncertainty consists of running
a series of decision making experiments. Each experiment has the same general structure and
consists of three parts. In the first part, participants have to make a series of decisions where they
have to choose between risky and ambiguous (or certain) prospects. Importantly, in each decision
situation there is also the possibility to state indifference, effectively delegating the choice to a fair
random device (henceforth, for brevity, option I). Our set-up is such that any model assuming
a single prior on ambiguous events predicts at most one choice in favor of option I. In contrast,
incomplete preferences under uncertainty, in the sense of multiple priors,5 can be revealed via
repeated choices of option I.6 In the second part, participants face a lottery choice task that we
use to elicit likelihood insensitivity. We use the data to estimate individual probability weighting
functions and study their relation to choices in the first part. In the third part, subjects have
to respond to questionnaires measuring some psychological constructs potentially important in
decision making under uncertainty and individual background information.
In total we report on three experiments. Experiment Risk-Ambi sets the stage and provides
our main result regarding repeated choices of option I and suggests the existence of incomplete
preferences. Experiment Risk-Sure tests whether our main result could be due to systematic
mistakes or ‘thick’ indifference curves. In Experiment Risk-Ambi-high we explore robustness
of our result in respect to increased prizes and test comparative statics predictions based on
multiple priors models.
Next we describe Risk-Ambi, where we explain the different parts in more detail. Regarding
choices in favor of option I, we provide theoretical predictions of different models of decision
making under uncertainty.
5In the following, for convenience, we will abuse language a bit and talk about “incomplete preferences” when
we mean “incomplete preferences under uncertainty, in the sense of multiple priors”.
6We note that with our procedure we likely underestimate repeated choices of I that are an expression of
incomplete preferences. As participants are forced to make some choice in each decision situation, individuals with
incomplete preferences may as well select the risky or ambiguous prospect. In this sense there may be unobserved
incomplete preferences.
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3 Experiment Risk-Ambi – Risk and Ambiguity
The experiment consists of three parts. Subjects were not informed about the structure of the
experiment and instructions for each part were administered on the computer screen only before
the beginning of the respective part.7
3.1 Part 1 – Decisions under Uncertainty
In the first part of the experiment participants face a series of decision situations where they
are asked to choose between a risky and an ambiguous prospect. Every decision situations is
displayed in a row of a table on the computer screen, and all prospects are characterized by
the same potential outcomes of AC15 and AC0. Risk is implemented by using a nontransparent
urn filled with 100 balls, colored red or black. In the experiment we call it Urn A. The color
composition of the urn varies in each decision situation by 5 balls. In the first decision situation
the urn contains 100 red balls, in the second decision situation it contains 95 red balls and 5
black balls, and so on, until the 21st, and last, decision situation where the urn contains 100
black balls.8 The ambiguous prospect is the same in all decision situations. Ambiguity is also
implemented with an urn, but now the urn contains 100 balls in unknown proportion of red and
black. This urn is called Urn B in the experiment. To credibly implement ambiguity we applied
the following procedure. The actual composition of Urn B is chosen by a fellow researcher at
Maastricht University, who is completely free to choose the color composition, except that the
total number of balls has to be 100. Our colleague then seals the urn and nobody except him,
who is in no other way involved in the experiment, knows its composition. The urns are visibly
placed in the experimental lab. Subjects are informed about the procedure and that they are
free to inspect the contents of the urns after the experiment is over.
Table 1 reproduces some of the decision situations participants see on the computer screen.9
Before the decision situations are displayed, each subject has to choose her personal winning
color, either red or black, which is the color associated with the high outcome of AC15. Each of
the 21 decision situations corresponds to a choice between the risky and the ambiguous prospect.
Importantly, different to most experiments on decision making under uncertainty, in each de-
cision situation, subjects can also avoid to actively select one of the prospects.10 Specifically,
7The instructions used in the experiment can be found in the Appendix.
8Urn A is publicly composed during the payment phase, after a random draw determines which one the 21
decision situations is relevant for payment.
9A screen shot of the actual decision table can be found in the Appendix D. To indicate their choice, participants
had to click on a check box displayed to the left of each option.
10Cohen et al. (1987) also allow for such an option.
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participants are informed that by choosing the middle option the choice between prospects is
delegated to a fair chance device, which selects one of the two prospects with equal probability.
For this option, we used the neutral phrase “I am indifferent between the two urns.” to avoid
any experimenter demand effect and connotation with respect to incompleteness. We refer to
this option simply as option I.11
Table 1: The decision situations
Decision Composition Composition
situation Urn A Urn B
1. 100 red balls I am indifferent 100 black and red balls
between the two urns. in unknown color ratio.
2. 95 red balls + I am indifferent 100 black and red balls
5 black balls between the two urns. in unknown color ratio
3. 90 red balls + I am indifferent 100 black and red balls
10 black balls between the two urns. in unknown color ratio
...
...
...
...
10. 55 red balls + I am indifferent 100 black and red balls
45 black balls between the two urns. in unknown color ratio
...
...
...
...
20. 5 red balls + I am indifferent 100 black and red balls
95 black balls between the two urns. in unknown color ratio
21. 100 black balls I am indifferent 100 black and red balls
between the two urns. in unknown color ratio
Choices are incentivized with the random-lottery method.12 In the written instructions at
the beginning of the experiment, participants are informed that each decision situation is equally
likely to be selected for payment. A subject earns the prize of AC15 if, for the relevant decision
situation, a ball of his/her preferred color is drawn, otherwise he/she earns nothing. The payment
procedure takes place publicly at the end of the experiment and subjects are informed about it
at the beginning of the experiment.
3.1.1 Choice Predictions
For our decision task, models of decision making under uncertainty that can be reduced to
(the equivalent of) single prior models, predict that an individual should choose option I at
most once in all decision situations. Specifically, this option should be chosen only when being
11Note that option I is neither a default option nor the status-quo and, hence, the well known biases relating
to these concepts cannot be a reason for participants to eventually choose this option (see, e.g., Kahneman, 2003;
Camerer, 2003; Camerer et al., 2011).
12See http://people.few.eur.nl/wakker/miscella/debates/randomlinc.htm for a discussion on the appropriateness
of the random-lottery incentives scheme.
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truly indifferent between the risky and the ambiguous prospect. Note, however, that indifferent
individuals may also choose Urn A or Urn B. We divide these models in three classes and discuss
them in what follows.
Subjective Expected Utility Theory. Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU, Savage
1954) models decision making under uncertainty with an expected utility representation, where
unknown probabilities are replaced by subjective priors on the ambiguous event. It is straight-
forward, that according to SEU theory, a participant would choose option I if and only if the
winning probability of the risky prospect equals her subjective prior on the ambiguous event.
Thus, SEU predicts that option I is chosen at most once.
Uncertainty Aversion. The models in this class are based on the idea that the decision maker
has standard preferences, but may hold multiple priors on the ambiguous event and may be averse
to ambiguity. The seminal work of David Schmeidler initiated this approach (see Schmeidler
1989 and Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), and more recently Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) provided
a representation result that allows to unify these models. For illustration purposes, we discuss
only α-Maxmin Expected Utility theory (Ghirardato et al., 2004), but the derived result hold for
the whole class of models. According to this theory, the expected utility of a prospect is given by
the α-weighted sum of the worst and best possible scenario, with α capturing the DM’s aversion
to ambiguity. That is, although priors can be multiple, decision making is based on a unique
representation of the ambiguous prospect. As a consequence, it is predicted that subjects choose
option I at most once.13
Cumulative Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and its ex-
tension, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) for decision making
under risk and uncertainty, introduce the idea that individuals’ choices under uncertainty are
best described by allowing for decision weights, that apply to both objective and subjective
probabilities. In our decision task, in a given decision situation, an individual may choose option
I when the risky and the ambiguous event receive equal decision weight. That is, when being
truly CPT-indifferent between the risky and ambiguous prospects. Moreover, option I may be
chosen in several decision situations if and only if the winning probabilities of different risky
prospects receive equal decision weight.14 Stated differently, a participant may choose option I
more than once only if she is sufficiently insensitive to likelihood changes. In order to investi-
13For a formal proof, see Appendix A.
14For a formal proof, see Appendix A.
7
gate this possibility we implement a choice task that allows estimating CPT parameters at the
individual level.
3.2 Part 2 – Lottery Task
In this part of the experiment we elicit participants’ certainty equivalents for 33 lotteries (see
Table 2). For each lottery subjects see a computer screen that contains a description of the
lottery and a list of 20 equally spaced sure amounts, ranging from the lottery’s high to its low
potential outcome. In each row of the list subjects have to make a choice between the lottery
and the sure amount. In order to facilitate comprehension, the lottery odds are expressed both
in percentage points and with the aid of a pie chart.15 Certainty equivalents are calculated as
the arithmetic mean of the smallest sure amount preferred to the lottery and the consecutive
sure amount in the list.
Table 2: Lotteries used in Lottery Task
p1 x1 x2 p1 x1 x2 p1 x1 x2
0.05 10 0 0.35 25 10 0.65 20 5
0.05 20 5 0.45 10 0 0.65 25 10
0.05 25 10 0.45 20 5 0.75 10 0
0.1 5 0 0.45 25 10 0.75 20 5
0.1 10 5 0.5 5 0 0.75 25 10
0.1 25 0 0.5 20 5 0.9 5 0
0.25 10 0 0.5 25 10 0.9 10 5
0.25 20 5 0.55 20 5 0.9 25 0
0.25 25 10 0.55 25 10 0.95 10 0
0.35 10 0 0.55 10 0 0.95 20 5
0.35 20 5 0.65 10 0 0.95 25 10
Note: p1 indicates the probability of winning ACx1; the prob-
ability of winning ACx2 is 1− p1.
In order to determine subjects’ payment for this part, at the end of the experiment one
decision screen and one row within the decision screen, are randomly selected. The relevant
lottery is then publicly played out and earnings are added to those of the first part.
15A screen shot of the computer display can be found in Appendix C.
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3.3 Part 3 – Questionnaires
In the last part of the experiment we ask participants some questions measuring the ability of
cognitive reflection and psychological constructs like analytical-rational processing and confidence
in intuitive abilities. Specifically, we administered the Cognitive Reflection test (Frederick, 2005)
and the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al., 1996). In addition we asked questions
about personal characteristics (age, gender, etc.) and how they experienced the experiment.
Details on the questionnaires can be found in Appendix C.
3.4 Procedures
The computerized experiment was conducted at the Behavioral and Experimental Lab (BEElab)
at Maastricht University, using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Upon entering the BEE-
lab, participants were randomly assigned to computer cubicles and not allowed to communicate
in any way. Of the 55 participants 90% were enrolled Maastricht University’s School of Business
and Economics and 60% of them were male. The average age was 23 years. The experiment
lasted on average 90 minutes and the average earnings per subjects were AC32.95. After all parts
have been finished earnings were determined as described above and paid out confidentially.
3.5 Results
For convenience, in what follows participants’ choices in Part 1 of the experiment are recoded
and analyzed as if red had been the selected winning color of each participant.16
We first explore if the choice pattern of our participants, when choosing between risky and
ambiguous prospects, is consistent with behavior reported in the literature. We find that the
risky prospect is chosen by the large majority of participants as long as the winning probability is
at least 0.5, whereas the ambiguous prospect is the most common choice in all decision situations
where the winning probability of the risky prospect is at most 0.4. Ignoring choices in favor of
option I, we use binomial tests to verify for each decision situation separately, whether the risky
or ambiguous prospect is chosen by the majority of participants. We find that the likelihood
of choices favoring the risky prospect is significantly larger than 50% at the 1% significance
level in all decision situations characterized by a winning probability of at least 0.5. On the
16To preclude that results are due to noise and/or incomprehension we exclude from the analysis all participants
who made (weakly) dominated choices in the first and last decision situation, such as choosing the ambiguous
prospect instead of the sure payment or choosing to earn nothing for sure instead of selecting the ambiguous
prospect. This leaves us with 35 observations. In Appendix E we report an analysis using data of all participants
and find that the results are qualitatively the same. Note also that excluding participants who have made such
choices makes the case for incompleteness more difficult as such behavior arguably is a reflection of incompleteness.
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other hand, choices favoring the ambiguous prospect are significantly more likely than 50% at
the 1% significance level in all choice situations characterized by a winning probability p ≤ 0.4.
In the decision situations where the winning probability of the risky prospect is equal to 0.45,
the number of individuals choosing the risky prospect is not significantly different from the
number choosing the ambiguous one (p-value = 0.19). Consistent with the large body of results
reported in the literature (see Camerer and Weber, 1992 for a review), these results thus indicate
that subjects are moderately averse to ambiguity. This gives us confidence in that our pool of
participants is similar to most other subject pools.
We now turn to our main research question and analyze choices in favor of option I. Our
first result in that respect is that the choice of option I is very frequent. When the winning
probability of the risky prospect, p, is equal to 0.35 almost one third of the participants (29%)
choose option I. Further, when 0.5 ≤ p ≤ 0.4, the relative majority of participants (40%) choose
option I, and when p = 0.55 20% of the participants choose I. These figures already suggest
that some individuals choose option I more than once.
This impression is corroborated by the histogram in Figure 1, which reports the relative
frequency of participants who choose option I n times. Specifically, only 23% of the subjects
never select option I and 29% select it exactly once. The remaining 48% of participants choose
option I in at least two decision situations and more than 35% choose option I at least three times.
Further, of those participants who choose option I more than once, 83% do so in consecutive
decision situations.
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Figure 1: Risk-Ambi – Relative frequency of participants choosing option I n times.
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To summarize, contrary to the predictions of the discussed decision making models, we find
that almost half of the participants choose option I more than once. This suggests that prefer-
ences of these individuals’ are incomplete when choosing between risky and ambiguous prospects.
However, as discussed in the previous section, when individuals are sufficiently insensitive to
likelihood changes, CPT may also account for such behavior. We address this possibility in the
following section.
Cumulative Prospect Theory. To test if likelihood insensitivity can explain repeated choices
of option I, we use the choice data of the second part of the experiment and estimate CPT
parameters at the individual level. For these estimations we need to choose specific functional
forms, both for the value function v(x) and probability weighting function w(p), that combine
parsimony with good data fit. For the value function it has been shown that a simple power
function v(x) = xα, α > 0 is a good compromise between these requirements (Wakker, 2008;
Bruhin et al., 2010). For probability weighting we adopt the function originally proposed by
Prelec (1998):
w(p) = exp(−(− ln p)γ) 0 < γ < 1 (1)
Like in the original formulation of prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky (1979), w(p) has an
inverted S-shape which implies that small probabilities are over-weighted and large probabilities
are under-weighted. The degree of deviation from linearity is conveniently captured by the single
parameter γ, where smaller values refer to larger deviations. The function has been used in several
empirical applications (see, e.g., Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Bruhin et al., 2010; Epper et al., 2011).
We jointly estimate the parameter values of α and γ at the individual level by minimizing the
sums of squared distances between the predicted and observed certainty equivalents. To correct
for heteroscedasticity, lottery outcomes are normalized.17
Recall that CPT can be used to explain repeated choices of option I if and only if the winning
probabilities of different risky prospects receive the same decision weight. Empirically, we see
that most choices of option I occur for winning probabilities between 0.35 and 0.50 of the risky
options. Applying the probability weighting function (1) it can be shown that γ ≤ 0.2 is needed
to ensure that the difference in probability weights for consecutive decision situations is about
0.01 or lower, for probabilities in the interval 0.25 to 0.6. Put differently, probability weighting
can explain repeated choices of option I only if γ is not larger than 0.2. We find that the average
17The calculation of certainty equivalents in the lottery choice tasks (in Part 2 of the experiment) requires a
unique switching point from the sure amount to the lottery. We did not impose this restriction on participants’
behavior in the experiment and do observe sometimes multiple switching points. In these cases we use the most
risk averse certainty equivalent.
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value of γ among subjects who choose option I more than once is 0.39, which is significantly
above the threshold value of 0.2 (Wilcoxon test p−value < 0.01).18 Moreover, out of the 17
participants who repeatedly choose option I only 3 have an estimated γ ≤ 0.2. Hence, we
conclude that likelihood insensitivity cannot explain the observed repeated choices of option I.
Our results so far show that about 50 percent of the participants repeatedly choose option I,
which is (1) inconsistent with prominent models of decision making under risk and uncertainty
(subjective expected utility, uncertainty aversion) and (2) cannot be explained by participants’
insensitivity to likelihood changes. Although suggestive for incomplete preferences due to mul-
tiple priors, one might argue that the repeated choice of option I is actually reflecting choice
mistakes (probabilistic choice or ‘thick’ indifference curves). In the next section we describe an
experiment designed to test this hypothesis.
4 Experiment Risk-Sure – The Role of Mistakes
Probabilistic choice models are based on the idea that individuals make choice mistakes and,
thus, when confronted with two options do not necessarily choose the one that maximizes their
utility. The likelihood of making a mistake is a function of the expected utility difference between
the available options: the larger the expected utility difference, the lower the probability of
choosing the dominated option. The first model of this kind was proposed by Luce (1959), and
applications in its spirit appear, for instance, in Harless and Camerer (1994) and Hey and Orme
(1994). According to this approach, the choice of option I in experiment Risk-Ambi could be
the result of mistakes, which are more likely when the expected utility difference between the
risky and the ambiguous prospect is perceived as small.
In order to test whether the repeated choice of option I is consistent with this interpretation,
we run an additional experiment with 50 subjects. Participants have to make choices between
risky prospects as in Risk-Ambi (see Table 1) but the ambiguous prospect is replaced by a sure
payment of AC7.50. Option I is also available, and if chosen, it entails that either the risky
prospect or the certain payment is assigned to the subject with equal probability.
If mistakes would be a good explanation for the behavior observed in Risk-Ambi, we should
observe that option I is also frequently and repeatedly chosen in Risk-Sure. For risk neutral
and weakly risk averse or risk seeking participants, option I should then be chosen most often
for winning probabilities around 0.50. Note, however, that due to the nature of the decision
situations, participants always face some decision situations where the utility difference between
the risky option and the certain payment is very small, irrespective of their actual risk preferences.
18The average estimated value of α is 0.88.
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4.1 Results
Figure 2 depicts the relative frequency of choices in favor of option I.19 It shows that 90 percent
of the participants choose option I at most once. This is in stark contrast to the observation
in Risk-Ambi where this was the case for only 51 percent. Hence, in Risk-Sure only very few
participants exhibit mistakes or thick indifference curves, which makes mistakes due to small
utility differences an unlikely explanation for the repeated choice of option I observed in Risk-
Ambi. Note, that the infrequent choice of option I in Risk-Sure also corroborates our finding,
reported further above, that decision weighting cannot account for the frequent choice of option
I in Risk-Ambi.
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Figure 2: Risk-Sure – Relative frequency of participants choosing option I n times.
5 Experiment Risk-Ambi-high – Robustness and Comparative
Statics Based on Incomplete Preferences
The purpose of our third experiment is to test (1) whether repeatedly choosing option I is robust
against a change in incentives, and (2) whether this behavioral regularity is consistent with the
existence of an incomplete preference relation between prospects. To this end we conduct an
experiment that is exactly the same as Risk-Ambi, described in Section 3, except that the prize
of the ambiguous prospect is now increased by one-third (i.e., AC5) and is thus equal to AC20.
19Applying the same criteria as in Risk-Ambi, we excluded from the analysis 10 subjects that choose a weakly
dominated option.
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Regarding robustness, we expect that also in Risk-Ambi-high a large percentage of partici-
pants will choose option I repeatedly. In addition, if repeated choice of option I is an expression
of incomplete preferences due to multiple priors on ambiguous prospects, we can formulate the
following hypotheses. In comparison to Risk-Ambi, option I is more often chosen in Risk-Ambi-
high (H1 ). Moreover, the decision situations where option I is most frequently chosen differ
between Risk-Ambi and Risk-Ambi-high. Specifically, we expect that in Risk-Ambi-highthese de-
cision situations are characterized by higher winning probabilities of the risky prospects (H2 ).20
In the following we develop the argument more formally.
We assume that (expected) utility in money u(.) is strictly increasing and w.l.o.g. normalize
u(0) = 0. Let p denote the winning probability of a risky prospect, x > 0 the prize in case of good
luck and 0 the prize in case of bad luck (cf. Table 1). A subject may have multiple priors on the
ambiguous event and we denote with w and b the subject’s worst and best (winning) prior on the
ambiguous event, respectively. In Risk-Ambi incomplete preferences due to multiple priors imply
that for some p ∈ [0, 1] and q ∈ ]w, b], pu(x) ≤ qu(x), and the subject would weakly prefer the
ambiguous event, whereas for the same p but another (smaller) q′ ∈ [w, b], pu(x) > q′u(x), and
the subject would prefer the risky event. Preferences are complete and the ambiguous (risky)
prospect is chosen when the expected utility of the ambiguous prospects calculated for w (b) is
larger (smaller) than the expected utility of the risky prospect.
Assume for convenience that the winning probabilities of a risky prospect in our experiments
change continuously (and not in steps of 0.05). Denote with pw1 the winning probability in
experiment Risk-Ambi such that the risky prospect in expectations gives the same outcome as
the ambiguous prospect with the worst prior applied. That is, pw1 u(x) = wu(x), implying p
w
1 = w.
Similarly, denote with pb1 the winning probability in experiment Risk-Ambi such that the risky
prospect gives the same expected outcome as the ambiguous outcome with the best prior applied:
pb1u(x) = bu(x), implying p
b
1 = b.
In experiment Risk-Ambi-high the prize for the ambiguous event is increased with y > 0.
The new prize is x + y > x, implying that pw1 u(x) < wu(x + y). Thus, in this experiment, for
pw3 u(x) = wu(x+ y) to hold it is necessary that p
w
3 > p
w
1 = w. Similarly, the higher prize implies
that pb1u(x) < bu(x+y) and for p
b
3u(x) = bu(x+y) to hold it is necessary that p
b
3 > p
b
1 = b. Hence,
measured in probabilities of the risky event, in Risk-Ambi-high the interval of multiple priors
should be shifted to higher winning probabilities than in Risk-Sure. This implies that if repeated
choices of option I indeed reflect incomplete preferences due to multiple priors on the ambiguous
20A necessary assumption for this prediction is that participants in Risk-Ambi and Risk-Ambi-high hold on
average the same prior beliefs on the ambiguous event. As the subject pool as well as all procedural details are
the same in all experiments there is no good reason for why this assumption should not hold.
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event, we should observe these choices at higher winning probabilities in Risk-Ambi-high than in
Risk-Ambi (cf. H2 ).
For the hypothesis that in Risk-Ambi-high option I tends be chosen more often than in Risk-
Ambi (cf. H1 ), it is necessary to show that the interval of multiple priors, measured in winning
probabilities of the risky prospect, is wider in Risk-Ambi-high than in Risk-Ambi, i.e, pb1 − p
w
1 <
pb3−p
w
3 . It is easily shown that this is indeed the case. Recall that p
b
1 = b and p
w
1 = w and suppose
to the contrary that pb1 − p
w
1 = b− w ≥ p
b
3 − p
w
3 and, hence, bu(x) − wu(x) ≥ p
b
3u(x) − p
w
3 u(x).
From pb3u(x) = bu(x+ y) and p
w
3 u(x) = wu(x + y) it follows that [b− w]u(x) ≥ [b− w]u(x+ y)
in contradiction to the strict monotonicity of u(.).
To illustrate in terms of the experiments, consider that a subject holds the set of priors
[0.33, 0.47]. In Risk-Ambi, this subject may thus choose option I for risky decision situations
characterized by winning probabilities p ∈ {0.35, 0.40, 0.45}. In Risk-Ambi-high, a ‘twin’ subject
holding the same set of prior beliefs may instead choose option I for risky decision situations
characterized by winning probabilities p ∈ {0.45, 0.50, 0.55, 0.60}.
For experiment Risk-Ambi-high we applied the same procedures as for the other two ex-
periments and recruited 53 students from Maastricht University. Subjects who took part in
Risk-Ambi or Risk-Sure were not allowed to participate. The experiment lasted on average 90
minutes and the average earnings per subjects were AC28.70.
5.1 Results
Subjects’ choices in Risk-Ambi-high reveal that the results obtained in Risk-Ambi are robust.21
For the moment ignoring choices of option I, the risky prospect is chosen by more than 50%
of the subjects in all decision situations characterized by p ≥ 0.55 (p−value ≤ 0.01, two sided
binomial test). Conversely, the ambiguous prospect is chosen by more than 50% of the subjects
in all decision situations where p ≤ 0.45 (p−value < 0.01). In the decision situation where
p = 0.50, the number of individuals choosing the risky prospect is not significantly different from
the number choosing the ambiguous one (p−value = 0.24).
More interestingly, Figure 3 shows a histogram of the relative frequency of option I in Risk-
Ambi-high (cf. Figure 1 for Risk-Ambi). It shows that about only 40 percent of the participants
choose option I at most once, whereas the remaining subjects choose it in at least two decision
situations. This data thus confirm that the repeated choice of option I is robust against increases
in the prize of the ambiguous prospect.
21As in the other experiments, we exclude from the analysis all subjects that made dominated choices in the
first and last decision situation. This leaves us with 38 observations.
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Figure 3: Risk-Ambi-high – Relative frequency of participants choosing option I n times.
When comparing participants’ choices in the two experiments, we find qualitative support for
H1. Consistent with the incomplete preferences model participants choose option I more often
in Risk-Ambi-high (2.6 times on average) than in Risk-Ambi (2.1 times on average). However,
the difference fails to reach statistical significance, which may be due to a too small prize change.
The comparative statics hypothesis H2 is supported qualitatively and quantitatively. Figure 4
shows how choices of option I are distributed over the decision situations in the two experiments.
Compared to Risk-Ambi, in Risk-Ambi-high, option I is most common in decision situations
characterized by a higher winning probability of the risky prospect, as predicted. To test whether
this change in behavior is statistically significant, we conduct chi-square tests for every decision
situation and test the hypothesis that option I is chosen more often in Risk-Ambi-high than in
Risk-Ambi. These tests indeed show that in Risk-Ambi-high significantly more subjects choose
option I in the decision situations characterized by p60 and p55 (p−value = 0.05 and 0.04,
respectively), whereas differences are statistically insignificant in all other decision situations
(p−values > 0.16).
In sum, experiment Risk-Ambi-high thus shows that the repeated choice of option I is a
robust phenomenon and that choices are consistent with the comparative statics predictions of
a model of multiple priors for the ambiguous event. This strongly suggests that the repeated
choice of option I indeed reveals incomplete preferences under uncertainty.
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Figure 4: Frequencies of choices of option I in Risk-Ambi and Risk-Ambi-high.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The completeness axiom has been identified as a questionable assumption of economic decision
making models and in response a number of theoretical models relaxing it have been developed.
However, empirical evidence on actual incompleteness of preferences is difficult to gather as such
evidence has to come from observed choices. In this paper we propose a series of laboratory
experiments with the aim to reveal whether preferences may be incomplete under uncertainty
(Gilboa et al., 2010). Our empirical strategy is to create a choice environment that allows us to
interpret behavior to be either consistent with classes of decision models, both normative and
descriptive, that assume completeness or with incomplete preferences due to multiple priors over
an ambiguous event.
We find that approximately half of the studied subjects display a choice pattern that is
inconsistent with models that allow for a single representation of the ambiguous prospect, choice
errors and decision weights, but can be explained by the existence of incomplete preference
relations. Indeed, consistent with an inability to pairwise rank choice options, subjects repeatedly
delegate their choices to a randomization device. The interpretation that the observed pattern
is due to incompleteness finds also support in psychological literature on decision making. There
it has been shown that people like to be able to justify their choices, to themselves and to others
(Simonson, 1989; Shafir et al., 1993). When preferences are incomplete it may be hard to justify
to select one prospect over the other and relegating the choice to some external device seems
appealing.
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The possibility to delegate choice to a randomization device relates our study to a few recent
empirical papers investigating a possible preference for randomization. Dominiak and Schnedler
(2011) experimentally investigate the relationship between randomization-loving and uncertainty-
aversion. They find that these are not negatively associated and that a non-negligible minority of
subjects are even randomization-averse. More closely related to our study, Dwenger et al. (2014)
conduct experiments where individuals have to choose between (sets of) vouchers twice, where
each choice is implemented with a certain known probability. In one treatment subjects can also
explicitly choose to randomize their choices. The authors find that a fraction of choices is implic-
itly consistent with a preference for randomization and that it increases when the randomization
possibility is explicit.
To explain their observations the authors propose a theoretical framework in the spirit of
regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982). The key assumptions are that decision makers may be
responsibility averse and that randomization allows them to minimize anticipated regret feelings
associated with choice responsibility. This framework may also be used to explain our results
when subjects have to choose between risky and ambiguous prospects (experiments Risk-Ambi
and Risk-Ambi-high). For that it needs to be assumed, however, that choosing option I relieves
the decision maker from anticipatory feelings of regret and rejoice. That is, the active choice of
the randomization devise should not be affected by any feelings of regret and rejoice, whereas an
active choice for the risky or ambiguous prospect will be affected. If one is willing to make this
assumption, it would imply that subjects should have a preference for randomization also when
they have to choose between risky prospects and certain payments.22 However, this is not the
case, as we have seen in our experiment Risk-Sure where subjects hardly ever choose option I
(see Section 4). Thus, anticipated regret feelings do not appear to be a satisfactory explanation
of the choice pattern observed in our experiments.
We note that our interpretation of the results should not be considered as a contradiction to
the explanations put forward in Dwenger et al. (2014). For one because we consider choices and
preferences under uncertainty, whereas Dwenger et al. (2014) explore decisions under risk. We
would rather suggest that incomplete preferences due to indecisiveness in taste (like in Ok et al.,
2012) may be an alternative framework to understand their results.
Incomplete preferences are also invoked as a plausible explanation for the results in
Agranov and Ortoleva (2013). The authors use a series of experiments to demonstrate that
22Specifically, it can be shown that, under the assumption that actively choosing option I does not lead to
regret-rejoice whereas active choice of the risky or ambiguous prospect does, to rationalize (repeated) choice of
option I in Risk-Ambi it is necessary that regret feelings are sufficiently stronger than rejoice feelings. If this is
the case it can be further shown that repeated choice of I should also be observed in Risk-Sure. See Appendix B
for a formal derivation of these statements.
18
stochastic choices can be deliberate instead of mistaken. They discuss the behavior observed in
their experiments in light of the model by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015), in which the decision
maker can be characterized by a set of possible utility functions over outcomes. When the de-
cision maker does not know which function she should maximize, a randomization device may
be strictly preferred to a deterministic choice. Our results suggest that delegation to a chance
device may also be ‘optimal’ when choices involve uncertain prospects. Moreover, our design
allows to interpret this behavior as due to incomplete preferences under uncertainty, as we show
the inadequacy of decision making models that assume completeness.
Decision making models relaxing the completeness axiom have proposed specific decision rules
that guide choice behavior when options cannot be ranked. In Gilboa et al. (2010), for example,
the model’s axioms imply that maxmin is employed when preferences are incomplete. We want to
emphasize that, although our experiments suggest that subjects may revert to randomization in
case of incompleteness, we do not intend to test which decision rule individuals actually employ.
Rather, our aim is to provide empirical evidence on the actual existence of incomplete preference
relations under uncertainty.
We show that incomplete preferences – next to being a theoretically possible and intuitively
appealing concept – can also be revealed. Our approach also shows that not all people exhibit
incomplete preferences under uncertainty as some appear to be less indecisive than others. In
future research, a more refined version of our experiments may even allow for discriminating
between different types of decision makers with incomplete preferences. Such a categorization
could then be used for determining the accurate model and for making accurate predictions on
an individual level.
Guided by the work of Gilboa et al. (2010), we would like to conclude with a reflection on
the rationality of the observed choice pattern. These authors propose that a decision maker can
make two types of choices. Objective rational choices are such that the decision maker could
convince others that she is right in making them, while choices are subjectively rational when
the decision maker cannot be convinced that she is wrong when making them. These two notions
of rationality are directly related to the completeness axiom: when preferences are incomplete
because of uncertainty, an objectively justifiable choice may not exists, but subjective rationality
eventually guides choice behavior. The repeated choice of option I seems consistent with this
notion of subjective rationality and it may be interesting to theoretically explore whether such
a decision rule could be axiomatically derived.
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Appendix
A Models of Decision Making under Uncertainty
In the following we consider the discussed models of decision making under uncertainty and prove that
they cannot account for the repeated avoidance of active choice.
A.1 α-maxmin Expected Utility Theory
Consider α− maxmin expected utility (MEU) theory as in Ghirardato et al. (2004). The decision maker
holds a set of priors C = [c, c] ⊆ [0, 1] on the ambiguous event and is characterized by an index α which
captures attitude to ambiguity. The index lies in the interval [0, 1] and can be viewed as the weight that the
decision maker places on the most pessimistic scenario, given his set of prior C. The utility function U(·)
is the same as assumed in expected utility theory. In our experiment, subjects would evaluate ambiguous
prospects as follows:
α−MEUa(x1, x2; q, α) = α min
q∈[c,c]
[qU(x1) + (1− q)U(x2)] + (1− α) max
q∈[c,c]
[qU(x1) + (1− q)U(x2)].
Where q is the (unknown) winning probability of the ambiguous prospect, x1 is the monetary prize equal
to AC15 and x2 is the AC0 outcome. Since the worst prior is c and the best prior is c and U(x1) (U(x2))
can be normalized to 1 (0), the above function is equivalent to:
α−MEUa(x1, x2; q, α) = αc+ (1− α)c.
Applying the same normalizations, expected utility from a risky prospect is given by EUr(x1, x2; pr) = pr.
Hence, a subject is indifferent between a risky prospect with winning probability pr and the ambiguous
prospect if and only if EUr(x1, x2; pr) = pr = αc + (1 − α)c = α − MEUa(x1, x2; q, α). As α and q
are independent of the winning probability pr of the risky prospect, this implies that option I should be
chosen at most once. From that it is also easy to see that any model assuming a decision rule that reduces
multiple priors to a single prior allows for at most one choice of option I. 
A.2 Cumulative Prospect Theory
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) as proposed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) allows for non-linear
decision weights. Let W+(pr) and W
+(A) be the decision weighting functions for risky and ambiguous
prospects, respectively, and let v(x) be a CPT value function. A decision maker evaluates the ambiguous
prospect as
CPTa(x1, x2;A) =W
+(A)v(x1) +W
+(¬A)v(x2)⇔ CPTa(x1, x2;A) = W
+(A)v(x1),
where A the denotes the winning event and ¬A its complement and the second equation follows (w.l.o.g.)
from the normalization v(x2) := 0. Similarly, a risky prospect with winning probability pr is evaluated as
CPTr(x1, x2; pr) =W
+(pr)v(x1) +W
+(1 − pr)v(x2)⇔ CPTr(x1, x2; pr) = W
+(pr)v(x1).
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It follows that multiple choices of option I for different winning probabilities pi, pi+1, . . . , pi+k of the risky
prospect are CPT rationalizable if and only if
W+(A) =W+(pi) = W
+(pi+1) = · · · =W
+(pi+n).
In other words, multiple choices of option I are possible under CPT if and only if the decision weight
function is very flat, at least locally. 
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B Anticipated Regret-Rejoice
Here we first show the conditions under which anticipated regret-rejoice may account for repeated choice
of option I in experiment Risk-Ambi, where participants had to choose between different risky prospects,
an ambiguous prospect, and option I. Thereafter, we derive the conditions for repeated choice of option I
in Risk-Sure, where participants had to choose between risky prospects, a sure fixed payment, and option
I. We will show that an asymmetry of the utility effect of regret and rejoice is a necessary condition
for rationalizing the choice of option I in both, Risk-Ambi and Risk-Sure. Therefore, since we observe
repeated choice of option I in Risk-Ambi, we should also observe it in Risk-Sure. This is not the case and
it is thus – on theoretical grounds – not possible to rationalize repeated choice of option I in Risk-Ambi
with anticipated regret-rejoice.
Note first that we need to assume that actively choosing option I does not lead to anticipated regret
or rejoice and, hence, outcomes of the chance device are evaluated according to expected utility (EU).
Without this assumption anticipated regret-rejoice could never explain repeated choice of option I as
active choices and delegated choices would have the same regret-rejoice consequences.
In contrast to option I, active choices of a risky, ambiguous, or certain prospect may lead to regret or re-
joice and are therefore evaluated using a regret-rejoice utility (RRU) as introduced by Loomes and Sugden
(1982). Hence, outcomes are evaluated according to V (x, y) = u(x)+R(u(x)−u(y)) where x is the actual
outcome, y the counter-factual outcome, u(.) a “choiceless utility function” (Loomes and Sugden, 1982,
p.807), and R(x− y) the real-valued regret-rejoice function with R(0) = 0; R(.) is non-decreasing. In the
following, under slight abuse of notation we will simply write x (y) for the assigned real-valued utility
index u(x) (u(y)) for outcomes x (y).
Regret-rejoice in experiment Risk-Ambi. Consider the 21 decisions between the risky and the
ambiguous prospects in Risk-Ambi. Below the possible states of the world are listed, where wR (lR)
denotes that a winning (losing) ball is extracted from the risky urn and wA (lA) denotes that a winning
(losing) ball is extracted from the ambiguous urn. LR (LA) denotes that the risky lottery matters for the
payment when option I was chosen.
The possible states of the world are:
S1
wR, LR, wA
S2
wR, LA,wA
S3
lR, LR, wA
S4
lR, LA, wA
S5
lR, LR, lA
S6
lR, LA, lA
S7
wR, LR, lA
S8
wR, LA, lA
Let p(Sr) denote the probability that state r is the true state of the world, pr the winning probability
of the risky urn in decision situation r, q the subjective winning probability a participant assigns to the
ambiguous urn, x1 the choiceless utility index of winning the (high) prize (AC15,- in the experiment), and
x2 the choiceless utility index of winning the (low) prize (AC0,- in the experiment). Below we will assume
x2 = 0 w.l.o.g.
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It follows that the RRU of the risky prospect is not smaller than the EU of choosing option I, i.e.,
RRU(risky) ≥ EU(option I), if and only if:
p(S1)[x1 + f(x1 − x1)] + p(S2)[x1 + f(x1 − x1)] + p(S3)[x2 + f(x2 − x2)] + p(S4)[x2 + f(x2 − x1)]+
p(S5)[x2 + f(x2 − x2)] + p(S6)[x2 + f(x2 − x2)] + p(S7)[x1 + f(x1 − x1)] + p(S8)[x1 + f(x1 − x2)] ≥
p(S1)x1 + p(S2)x1 + p(S3)x2 + p(S4)x1 + p(S5)x2 + p(S6)x2 + p(S7)x1 + p(S8)x2
⇔
p(S4)[0− x1 + f(0− x1)] + p(S8)[x1 − 0 + f(x1 − 0)] ≥ 0
⇔
(1− pr)
1
2
q[−x1 + f(−x1)] + pr
1
2
(1 − q)[x1 + f(x1)] ≥ 0
⇔
pr[x1 + f(x1)− qf(−x1)− qf(x1)] ≥ q[x1 − f(−x1)]
⇔
pr[x1 + [1− q]f(x1)− qf(−x1)] ≥ q[x1 − f(−x1)]
⇔
pr ≥
q[x1 − f(−x1)]
x1 + [1− q]f(x1)− qf(−x1)
:= pexp1 (2)
Similarly, the RRU of the ambiguous prospect is not smaller than the EU of choosing option I, i.e.,
RRU(ambiguous) ≥ EU(option I), if and only if:
p(S1)[x1 + f(x1 − x1)] + p(S2)[x1 + f(x1 − x1)] + p(S3)[x1 + f(x1 − x2)] + p(S4)[x1 + f(x1 − x1)]+
p(S5)[x2 + f(x2 − x2)] + p(S6)[x2 + f(x2 − x2)] + p(S7)[x2 + f(x2 − x1)] + p(S8)[x2 + f(x2 − x2)] ≥
p(S1)x1 + p(S2)x1 + p(S3)x2 + p(S4)x1 + p(S5)x2 + p(S6)x2 + p(S7)x1 + p(S8)x2
⇔
p(S3)[x1 − 0 + f(x1 − 0)] + p(S7)[0− x1 + f(0− x1)] ≥ 0
⇔
(1− pr)
1
2
q[x1 + f(x1)] + pr
1
2
(1− q)[−x1 + f(−x1)] ≥ 0
⇔
q[x1 + f(x1)] ≥ pr[x1 − [1− q]f(−x1) + qf(x1)]
⇔
pr ≤
q[x1 + f(x1)]
x1 − [1− q]f(−x1) + qf(x1)
:= p
exp1
(3)
To rationalize repeated choice of option I as an optimal decision under regret-rejoice it must hold
that RRU(risky) < EU(option I) and RRU(ambiguous) < EU(option I) and, hence, that there are some
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winning probabilities pr of the risky prospect such that pr < pexp1 and pr > pexp1 simultaneously hold.
A first observation is that this can never hold when regret and rejoice have a symmetric effect as for
f(x1) = −f(−x1) equations (2) and (3) collapse to pexp1 = pexp1. Further, a necessary condition for
option I to be an optimal choice is that
p
exp1
< pexp1 ⇔
q[x1 + f(x1)]
x1 − [1− q]f(−x1) + qf(x1)
<
q[x1 − f(−x1)]
x1 + [1− q]f(x1)− qf(−x1)
⇔
[x1 + f(x1)][x1 + [1− q]f(x1)− qf(−x1)] < [x1 − f(−x1)][x1 − [1− q]f(−x1) + qf(x1)]⇔
(after some rearrangements)
q[2x1[−f(−x1)− f(x1)] + [−f(−x1)]
2 − [f(x1)]
2] < 2x1[−f(−x1)− f(x1)] + [−f(−x1)]
2 − [f(x1)]
2.
In the last inequality both sides are identical, except for the multiplication with q on the l.h.s. Hence,
on the one hand, the inequality will be satisfied for all q ∈ [0, 1[ if the r.h.s. is strictly positive, that is,
if −f(−x1) > f(x1). On the other hand, it will never be satisfied for any q ∈ [0, 1[ if −f(−x1) ≤ f(x1).
Thus, the necessary condition for anticipated regret-rejoice to be an explanation for repeated choice of
option I in Risk-Ambi can be satisfied only if the disutility from anticipated regret is sufficiently stronger
than the anticipated utility from rejoice. 
Regret-rejoice in experiment Risk-Sure. Here we show that if regret-rejoice would be the
motivational force behind the repeated choice of option I in Risk-Ambi, we should observe repeated
choice of option I also in Risk-Sure.
Recall that in Risk-Sure subjects made 21 decisions between varying risky lotteries and a fixed sure
payment. Below the possible states of the world are listed, where wR (lR) denotes that a winning (losing)
ball is extracted from the risky urn. The letter R indicates that the risky prospect is relevant, whereas
the letter S indicates that the sure payment is relevant, in case a subject has chosen option I (i.e., has
delegated the choice to the fair chance device). As before x1 (x2) denotes the choiceless utility index for
the high and low prize, respectively. In the experiment the high prize was AC15, the low prize AC0, and
the sure payment AC7,50. We assume below x2 = 0 and indicate the utility index of the sure payment by
xs := αx1 (0 < α < 1) w.l.o.g.
The possible states of the world are:
S1
wR, R
S2
wR, S
S3
lR, R
S4
lR, S.
It follows that the RRU of choosing a given risky prospect with winning probability pr is not smaller
than the EU of choosing option I, i.e. RRU(risky) ≥ EU(option I), if and only if:
p(S1)[x1 + f(x1 − x1)] + p(S2)[x1 + f(x1 − αx1)] + p(S3)[x2 + f(x2 − x2)] + p(S4)[x2 + f(x2 − αx1)] ≥
p(S1)x1 + p(S2)αx1 + p(S3)x2 + p(S4)αx1
⇔
pr
1
2
[x1 − αx1 + f (x1 − αx1)] + (1− pr)
1
2
[−αx1 + f (−αx1)] ≥ 0
⇔
pr [x1 + f (x1 − αx1)− f (−αx1)] ≥ αx1 − f (−αx1)
⇔
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pr ≥
αx1 − f (−αx1)
x1 + f (x1 − αx1)− f (−αx1)
=: pexp2. (4)
Similarly, the RRU of the safe payment is not smaller than the expected utility of option I, i.e.,
RRU(safe) ≥ EU(option I), if:
p(S1)[αx1 + f(αx1 − x1)] + p(S2)[αx1 + f(αx1 − αx1)]+
p(S3)[αx1 + f(αx1 − x2)] + p(S4)[αx1 + f(αx1 − αx1)] ≥ p(S1)x1 + p(S2)αx1 + p(S3)x2 + p(S4)αx1
⇔
pr
1
2
[αx1 − x1 + f(αx1 − x1)] + [1− pr]
1
2
[αx1 + f(αx1)] ≥ 0
⇔
pr [−x1 + f (αx1 − x1)− f (αx1)] ≥ − [αx1 + f (αx1)]
⇔
pr [x1 − f (αx1 − x1) + f (αx1)] ≤ αx1 + f (αx1)
⇔
pr ≤
αx1 + f (αx1)
x1 − f (αx1 − x1) + f (αx1)
=: p
exp2
. (5)
To rationalize repeated choice of option I as an optimal decision under regret-rejoice it must hold that
RRU(risky) < EU(option I) and RRU(safe) < EU(option I) and, hence, that there are some winning
probabilities pr of the risky prospect such that pr < pexp2 and pr > pexp2 simultaneously hold. From
conditions (4) and (5) it follows that p
exp2
< pexp2 is a necessary condition for this to hold; or equivalently
αx1 + f (αx1)
x1 − f (αx1 − x1) + f (αx1)
<
αx1 − f (−αx1)
x1 + f (x1 − αx1)− f (−αx1) .
After some rearrangements this inequality can be written as
αx1[f(x1[1− α]) + f(−x1[1− α])] + [1− α]x1[f(αx1) + f(−αx1)] +
f(x1[1− α])f(αx1)− f(−x1[1− α])f(−αx1) < 0,
which can hold only if f(z) < −f(−z), i.e., when regret generates a stronger disutility than rejoice
generates additional utility.
To see this suppose to the contrary that f(z) ≥ −f(−z). It is easy to see that for f(z) = −f(−z) all
terms vanish and the inequality can thus not be satisfied. Therefore, suppose f(z) > −f(−z). It follows
that both terms in square brackets (first row of the inequality) are strictly positive. It is now sufficient to
show that f(x1[1−α])f(αx1)−f(−x1[1−α])f(−αx1) > 0. Note, that f(x1[1−α]) > −f(−x1[1−α]) > 0
and f(αx1) > −f(−αx1) > 0 and, hence, f(x1[1 − α])f(αx1) > −f(−x1[1 − α])f(αx1) > 0 as well as
−f(−x1[1−α])f(αx1) > −f(−x1[1−α])[−f(−αx1)] > 0, which implies f(x1[1−α])f(αx1) > −f(−x1[1−
α])[−f(−αx1)] and, thus, f(x1[1− α])f(αx1)− f(−x1[1− α])f(−αx1) > 0.
That regret is sufficiently stronger than rejoice is also a necessary condition for the regret-rejoice motive
to rationalize repeated choice of option I in Risk-Ambi. Therefore, if regret-rejoice would explain repeated
choice of option I there, we should observe repeated choice of option I also in Risk-Sure. However, as
shown in Section 4 this is not the case. 
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C Instructions of the Experiment
We report here the original instructions used in experiment Risk-Ambi and in brackets the parts changing
in experiment Risk-Sure. The instructions used in Risk-Ambi-high are identical except for the increased
winning prize of the ambiguous prospect and available upon request. The instructions were computerized.
C.1 Part 1
Shortly you are going to face 21 choice situations (situations 1-21). These choice situations will involve
two urns (i.e. boxes). These urns really exist and they will play an important role in determining your
earnings. You might have seen them on the table when you entered the lab. At the end of the experiment
you will have the possibility to personally check their content.
In one urn there are 100 balls colored black and red. The exact number of black and red balls contained
in this urn is always displayed in the decision table that you will see shortly. For convenience we call
this urn Urn A. The other urn, that we call Urn B, contains 100 balls as well. However, the exact
number of black and red balls in this urn is unknown to you. In fact, the composition of Urn B
is also unknown to us because it was composed by a colleague of us and sealed thereafter, while we were
absent. Our colleague was free to put any number of red and/or black balls into this urn provided the
total number of balls is 100.
In each choice situation you will be asked to bet on a draw of a ball of a certain color by selecting one of
the two different types of urns. You are first given the possibility to select the color (black or red) that
you like to bet on. The color you select will neither be to your advantage nor to your disadvantage. Also
note that you will choose the color once for all choice situations.
[Shortly you are going to face 21 choice situations (situations 1-21). These choice situations will involve
one urn (i.e. a box). This urn really exists and it will play an important role in determining your earnings.
In the urn there are 100 balls colored black and red. The exact number of black and red balls contained
in the urn changes in each choice situation and is always displayed in the decision table that you will see
shortly. In each choice situation you will be asked whether you want to bet on a draw of a ball of a certain
color from the urn or whether you prefer to receive a certain amount of money. You are first given the
possibility to select the color (black or red) that you like to bet on. The color you select will neither be
to your advantage nor to your disadvantage. Also note that you will choose the color once for all choice
situations.]
This is a screen shot of a part of the table you are going to see. Each row of the table represents one
choice situation:
In each row you have to decide between Urn A and Urn B to bet on the color you have selected.
You can also state that you are indifferent between the two urns.
Recall that Urn B contains an unknown proportion of 100 black and red balls. Urn A contains 100 balls
as well: the proportion of black and red balls is always displayed in the table.
[In each row you have to decide whether you want to bet on the color you have selected or whether you
want to receive 7.50 Euro for sure. You can also state that you are indifferent between these two options. ]
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Determination of earnings
At the end of the experiment one of the choice situations in the table is randomly selected with equal
probability to determine your earnings. Thereafter, a ball is drawn from the urn you decided to bet on
in the choice situation that was randomly selected.
Suppose, for example, that red is your color and that choice situation 7 is randomly selected. Suppose
further that you decided to bet on Urn A in that choice situation. At the end of the experiment, a ball
is drawn from Urn A, which contains 70 red balls and 30 black balls in choice situation 7. You receive 15
Euro if the ball is red and nothing otherwise.
Similarly, if in choice situation 7 you have decided to bet on Urn B, which contains 100 balls in unknown
color composition, a ball is drawn from it. You receive 15 Euro if the ball is red and nothing otherwise.
In case you were indifferent between the two urns, one is randomly selected with equal probability to
determine your earnings.
[ At the end of the experiment one of the choice situations in the table is randomly selected with equal
probability to determine your earnings. Depending on which choice situation is selected, the experimenter
will put the appropriate number of red and black balls in the urn. For instance, if choice situation 12 is
selected for payment, the experimenter will put 55 red balls and 45 black balls in the urn. At the end of
the experiment you will have the possibility to personally check the content of the urn.
Suppose, for example, that you selected red and that choice situation 7 is randomly selected at the end
of the experiment. Suppose further that you chose to bet on the urn in that choice situation. A ball is
then drawn from the urn which contains 70 red balls and 30 black balls in situation 7. You receive 15
Euro if the ball is red and nothing otherwise.
Differently, the ball drawn from the urn does not influence your earnings if in choice situation 7 you
decided that you prefer to get 7.50 Euro for sure. In case you were indifferent between betting on the
urn and earning 7.50 Euro for sure, one of these two options is randomly selected with equal probability
to determine your earnings. ]
Estimation of the composition of Urn B
Now that you have made your choices, we would like to ask you for your best estimate of the color
composition of Urn B.
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The categories below are intervals indicating the number of red balls that might be contained in Urn B.
Please click on the check box that represents your best estimate. You can also click on more than one
box.
Consider the following random examples.
For instance, if you believe that there are between 12 and 34 red balls in Urn B, you should click on the
3rd, 4th, 5th 6th and 7th check box from the left.
For instance, if you believe that there are between 72 and 74 red balls in Urn B than you should click on
the 15th check box form the left.
For instance, if you believe that there are exactly 6 red balls in Urn B than you should click on the 2nd
check box from the left.
If you believe that there between 17 and 24 red balls or between 63 and 69 red balls in Urn B then
you should click on the 4th, 5th, 13th and 14th check box. Notice that this part was not included in
experiment Risk-Sure.
C.2 Part 2
You are now going to make another series of choices. These choices will not influence your earnings
from the choices you just made, nor will your earlier choices influence the earnings from the choices you
are going to make. After you have made the these choices you will be asked to answer some questions.
Thereafter the experiment will be over.
In the following, you will be confronted with a series of 33 decision situations that will appear in
random order on the screen. All these decision situations are completely independent of each other. A
choice you made in one decision situation does not affect any of the other following decision situations.
Each decision situation is displayed on a screen. The screen consists of 20 rows. You have to decide for
every row whether you prefer option A or option B. Option A is a lottery and is the same for every
row in a given decision situation, while the secure option B takes 20 different values, one for each row.
By clicking on NEXT you will see an example screen of a decision situation.
This is a screen shot of one decision situation you are going to face. You are not asked to make choices
now! Please have a careful look. Determination of earnings
At the end of the experiment one of the 33 decision situations will be randomly selected with equal
probability. Once the decision situation is selected, one of the 20 rows in this decision situation will be
randomly selected with equal probability.
The choice you have made in this specific row will determine your earnings. Consider, for instance, the
screen shot that you have just seen.
Option A gives you a 55% chance to earn 10.- Euro and a 45% chance to earn nothing. Option B is
always a sure amount that ranges from 10.- Euro in the first row, to 0.50 Euro in the 20th row. Suppose
that the 12th row is randomly selected. If you would have selected option B, you would receive 4.50
Euro. If, instead, you would have selected option A, the outcome of the lottery determines your earnings.
The lottery will be paid out by publicly drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards.
Please note that each decision situation has the same likelihood to be the one that is relevant for your
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earnings. Therefore, you should view each decision independently and consider all your choices
carefully.
C.3 Part 3
Cognitive Reflection Test
You have now finished with the 33 decision situations. In the following screens we ask you to answer
some questions. Please read the following questions carefully and type your answer in the boxes. You
will earn 0.50 Euro for each correct answer provided.
(1) A bat and a ball cost 1.10 Euro in total. The bat costs 1.00 Euro more than the ball. How many
cents does the ball cost?
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long (in minutes) would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets?
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for
the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
(4) Two cars are on a collision course, traveling towards each other in the same lane. Car A is
traveling 70 km an hour. Car B is traveling 80 km an hour. How far apart are the cars one minute before
they collide? Please answer in km.23
23This question is not part of the original CRT by Shane (2005). We added it to increase the complexity of the
task. However, in the data analysis we do not consider answers to this question.
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Rational Experiential Inventory
What is your opinion on the following statements?(subjects had to answer on a 5 point scale, where
1=“completely false”; 5=“completely true”)
1. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge
my thinking abilities
2. I don’t like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
4. I find little satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
5. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
6. The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me.
7. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
8. Simply knowing the answer rather than understanding the reasons for the answer to a problem is fine
with me.
9. I don’t reason well under pressure.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top does not appeal to me.
11. I prefer to talk about international problems rather than gossip about celebrities.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
13. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important
but does not require much thought.
14. I generally prefer to accept things as they are rather than to question them.
15. It is enough for me that something gets the job done, I don’t care how or why it works.
16. I tend to set goals that can be accomplished only by expending considerable mental effort.
17. I have difficulty thinking in new and unfamiliar situations.
18. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.
19. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth
about something.
20. My initial impressions of people are almost always right.
21. I trust my initial feelings about people.
22. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my “gut feelings.”
23. I believe in trusting my hunches.
24. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can’t explain how I know.
25. I am a very intuitive person.
26. I can typically sense right away when a person is lying.
27. I am quick to form impressions about people.
28. I believe I can judge character pretty well from a person’s appearance.
29. I often have clear visual images of things.
30. I have a very good sense of rhythm.
31. I am good at visualizing things.
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D Screen Shot of Decision Situations
Figure D.1 displays a screen shot of the whole decision table in Risk-Ambi.
Figure D.1: Decision table in Part 1.
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E Robustness Checks
In the following we present results for the three experiments when the analysis is conducted with all
participants, including those who have taken (weakly) dominated choices.
E.1 Experiment Risk-Ambi
The number of choices in favor of the risky prospect is significantly larger than 50 percent in all decision
situations characterized by p ≥ 0.5 (p−value < 0.01). Choices favoring the ambiguous prospect are
significantly larger than 50 percent in all choice situations characterized by p ≤ 0.4 (p−value < 0.01).
In the decision situation where p = 0.45, the number of individuals choosing the risky prospect is not
significantly different than the number choosing the ambiguous one (p−value = 0.11).
Option I is chosen by 35 percent of the subjects when p = 0.50, by 38 percent when p = 0.45, and
by 35 percent when p = 0.40 and p = 0.35. In all the other decision situations, option I is chosen by at
most 22 percent of the subjects. The histogram in Figure E.1 reports the relative frequency of subjects
that choose option I for n times. Only 22 percent of the subjects never select option I and 20 percent
select it exactly once. The remaining 58 percent of the subjects choose option I in at least two decision
situations.
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Figure E.1: Risk-Ambi – Relative frequency of participants choosing option I n times.
Likelihood insensitivity We find that on average subjects who choose option I more than once are
characterized by α = 0.92 and γ = 0.39. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that γ is significantly higher
than the threshold value of 0.2 (p−value < 0.01). When considering all participants to the experiment we
find that α = 0.89 and γ = 0.43 on average.
Hence, overall the results of Risk-Ambi reported in the main text also hold when using the whole
sample.
36
E.2 Experiment Risk-Sure
Figure E.2 reports the relative frequency of choices in favor of option I when participants make choices
between risky prospects and a safe payment of AC7, 50. A comparison with Figure 2 shows that there are
no substantial differences and the results reported in the main text also hold here.
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Figure E.2: Risk-Sure – Relative frequency of participants choosing option I.
E.3 Experiment Risk-Ambi-high
A binomial test shows that the risky prospect is chosen by more than 50 percent of the subjects in all
choice situations characterized by a winning probability of at least 0.55 (p−value ≤ 0.02). Choices in
favor of the ambiguous prospect are significantly larger than 50 percent in all choice situations where
the winning probability of the risky prospects is at most 0.45 (p− value ≤ 0.03). When the winning
probability is 50 percent subjects do not clearly favor one type of prospect (p−value = 0.19). Figure E.3
shows a histogram of the relative frequency of indecisive choices. Similarly to the results reported in the
main text, approximately one third of the subjects never choose option I, whereas almost 60 percent
choose it in at least two decision situations.
Figure E.4 shows how choices in favor of option I are distributed over the decision situations in Risk-
Ambi and Risk-Ambi-high. Behavior in Risk-Ambi-high is qualitatively consistent with the predictions
based on the existence of incomplete preferences. That is, in comparison to Risk-Ambi, option I is more
frequent in decision situations characterized by a higher winning probability. We conduct Chi-square tests
in every decision situation and test the hypothesis that option I is chosen by the same number of subjects
in the two experiments. Due to the behavior of inconsistent subjects, especially in Risk-Ambi, we observe
that in a few decision situations option I is significantly more frequently chosen in that experiment than
in Risk-Ambi-high. Thus, overall, the results are similar to those reported in the main text, except that
the comparative statics predictions fail to be confirmed.
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Figure E.3: Risk-Ambi-high– Relative frequency of participants choosing option I.
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Figure E.4: Frequencies of choices of option I in Risk-Ambi and Risk-Ambi-high.
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F Individual characteristics
In the following we present some descriptive statistics on the participants’ individual characteristics, as
measured in the last part of the experiment, and relate them to choices in favor of option I. Since we do
not observe significant differences between subjects participating in Risk-Ambi and Risk-Ambi-high, we
pool the data of these two experiments. In order to investigate how cognitive abilities and thinking styles
affect decision making in part 1 of the experiments, subjects are administered the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005) and the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al., 1996). The CRT
is a 3 items test that measures the ability to reflect on a problem. The score ranges from 0 to 1, where
higher values indicate a higher performance. Subjects are rewarded with AC0.50 for each correct answer
and have a limited time. The REI includes a measure on a 5 point scale of analytical-rational processing
(abbreviated as NFC, Need For Cognition) and another measure, also on a 5 points scale, of engagement
and confidence in one’s intuitive abilities (abbreviated as FI, Faith in Intuition). In the following we first
report results for participants who did not make weakly dominated choices, followed by the results when
taking all participants into account.
Table F.1 compares individual characteristics of participants who choose option I at most once with
those choosing option I at least twice. The table also includes information on gender and means of
the parameters estimates that capture the shape of subjects’ probability weighting and value function.
Individuals that choose Option I more than once appear to be quite similar in the measured characteristics
to those who only choose it at most once, except that there are more female subjects in the former group.
Regression results in Table F.2 confirm that gender is the only significant correlate of repeated choice of
option I.
Table F.1: Individual characteristics by number of times option I is chosen.
Option I ≤ 1 Option I > 1
male 73% 33%
mean CRT 0.57 (0.35) 0.47 (0.29)
mean NFC 2.35 (0.39) 2.40 (0.34)
mean FI 3.39 (0.58) 3.60 (0.54)
mean γ 0.48 (0.23) 0.39 (0.22)
mean α 0.82 (0.26) 0.87 (0.23)
N 33 40
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Tables F.3 and F.4 report the same analysis when taking all participants into account. Results are
very similar, except that the gender difference vanishes.
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Table F.2: Determinants of number of option I choices (OLS)
(no weakly dominated choices)
Coefficient (Std. Err.)
male -1.945∗∗∗ (0.635)
CRT -0.558 (0.795)
NFC 0.787 (0.698)
FI -0.120 (0.455)
γ -0.056 (1.403)
α 0.761 (1.035)
Constant 1.537 (2.534)
N 73
R2 0.198
F(6,66) 2.716
Table F.3: Individual characteristics by number of times option I is chosen.
Option I ≤ 1 Option I > 1
male 71% 44%
mean CRT 0.50 (0.36) 0.47 (0.30)
mean NFC 2.38 (0.39) 2.43 (0.35)
mean FI 3.39 (0.56) 3.57 (0.51)
mean γ 0.44 (0.23) 0.37 (0.24)
mean α 0.81 (0.24) 0.90 (0.32)
N 45 63
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table F.4: Determinants of number of option I choices (OLS)
(no weakly dominated choices)
Coefficient (Std. Err.)
male -0.737 (0.945)
CRT 0.173 (1.286)
NFC 0.886 (1.122)
FI -0.358 (0.776)
γ -0.870 (1.964)
α 1.404 (1.426)
Constant 2.039 (4.173)
N 108
R2 0.026
F(6,101) .455
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